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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of
GREGORY J. OLSEN, Deceased
Applicant and Petitioner,

vs.
SAMUEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT, CO.
and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,

)

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

]
]1
I

Case No.: 960398-CA

Defendants and Respondants )

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (2)(a) (1992) 35-1-82.53 (2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), and 63-46b-14 (1993).

This is an appeal from a final

order wherein the Utah State Industrial Commission reversed the
ALJ's decision and ignored the plain and clear language of Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b), which mandates that the employer serve
written

notice

upon

the

insurance

carrier

and

the

Industrial

Commission if compensation coverage is not desired for an officer
or director of a corporation.

Until written notice is served upon

both, then the officer or director is considered an employee.

The

Commission found that when the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
(the Fund) , had sent its weekly computer tape to the Industrial
1

Commission, that

tape satisfied

the statutory

service of written notice by the employer.

requirement of

A Petition for Review

was timely filed on June 12, 1996.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the Industrial Commission exceed its authority when
it denied applicant and her three minor children death benefits
when the Commission disregarded the clear language of Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-43 (3) (b), which requires the employer to give written
notice to both the Industrial Commission and the insurance carrier
and the defendant employer did not do this?
Must defendants pay the decedent's widow and three minor
children benefits because the defendant employer did not comply
with Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b)?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b) (1990) is dispositive of
this appeal. Also, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1990) is applicable in
this case. No other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
apply.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gregory James Olsen ("Olsen") was a director or officer
of Samuel Mclntyre Investments on or about June 3, 1994.
He was also an employee on that date.

(R. 41)

(R. 41)

Olsen was acting

within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his
2

death.

(R. 41) In March of 1993, the Workers Compensation Fund of

Utah (the Fund) received written notice from the employer that Mr.
Olsen (a corporate officer) was to be excluded from coverage.
41) The employer paid no further premiums for Mr. Olsen.
The employer did not give written notice

to the

(R.

(R. 41)

Industrial

Commission that Mr. Olsen was to be excluded from coverage as
required by statute.

(R. 30, 41)

Without a hearing, because the parties stipulated to the
facts, the ALJ ordered defendants to pay death benefits.
Defendants filed a Motion for Review.

(R. 45)

(R. 53) On June 10, 1996,

the Industrial Commission reversed the ALJ's order.
Petitioner then timely filed this Petition.

(R. 108)

(R. Ill)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gregory James Olsen ("Olsen") was a director or officer
of Samuel Mclntyre Investments on or about June 3, 1994.
He was also an employee on that date.

(R. 41)

(R. 41)

Olsen was acting

within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his
death.

(R. 41) In March of 1993, the Workers Compensation Fund of

Utah (the Fund) received written notice from the employer that Mr.
Olsen (a corporate officer) was to be excluded from coverage.
41) The employer paid no further premiums for Mr. Olsen.
The employer did not

give written notice

to the

(R. 41)

Industrial

Commission that Mr. Olsen was to be excluded from coverage.
30, 41)

(R.

(R.

On March 30, 1994, the Workers Compensation Fund made a

computer entry memorializing the exclusion.
3

(R. 41) The Fund sent

the weekly computer tape to the Industrial Commission.

(R. 41)

Said tape contains changes in policy information including updated
exclusions cr coverage.

(R. 41)

The Fund has collected premiums

retroactively when the Fund has discovered that a large group of
employees was not covered by the employer but should have been.
(R. 42)

However, this has only been done on rare occasions and on

a large scale basis.

(R. 42)

On July 30, 1994 the employer sent to the Fund a
"Employer's First Report of Injury or Illness."

(R. 001) The Fund

denied benefits to the widow and three minor children of Olsen,
claiming that the decedent chose not to have coverage.

(R. 002)

After the widow filed an Application for Hearing, the parties
stipulated to the facts and the ALJ had the parties brief the issue
of whether there was coverage or not.

(R. 003, 021) The ALJ found

that the employer had not sent written notice to the Industrial
Commission as required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43 (3) (b) , (R. 45)
which states:
A corporation may elect not to include
any director or officer of the corporation as
an employee under this chapter.
If a
corporation makes this election, it shall
serve written notice upon its insurance
carrier and upon the commission naming the
persons to be excluded from coverage.
A
director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee under this chapter
until this notice has been given. (R. 41)
The ALJ ordered the employer's insurance carrier to pay death
benefits to the widow and three minor children because the employer
had not complied with the statute.

(R. 45)

The Fund filed a Motion for Review and the Industrial
4

Commission granted the Motion in a split decision (2-1) on June 10,
1996.

(R. 53, 108)

The majority of the Industrial Commission

found that the weekly computer tape sent by the Fund to the
Industrial Commission somehow satisfied Utah Code Ann. §35-143 (3) (b).

(R. 108)

Commissioner Carlson, in his dissent, stated

that the statute requires the employer to give written notice to
both the Industrial Commission and the insurance carrier.
108-9)

(R.

Commissioner Carlson also stated that the Industrial

Commission "has no authority to disregard the statute's clear
language.

Furthermore, the provisions

Compensation Act
coverage."

are to be

(R. 109)

liberally

of the Utah Workers'
construed

in

favor of

On June 12, 1996 petitioner timely filed a

Petition for Review with this Court.

(R. Ill)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission exceeded its authority when it
reversed the ALJ's decision and ignored the plain and clear
language of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3) (b) , which mandates that the
employer send written notice to the insurance carrier and the
Industrial Commission if compensation coverage is not desired for
an officer or director of the corporation.

Until written notice

was received by both, then the officer or director is considered an
employee. The Commission erroneously found that the Fund had sent
a computer tape to the Industrial Commission and that tape somehow
satisfied the statutory requirement of written notice from the
employer.
5

ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
The issue on appeal is a question of law. In considering
a question of law, the reviewing Court affords no deference to the
Industrial Commission's legal conclusions.
employs a correction-of-error standard.

Rather, this Court
Hurley v. Industrial

Commission, 767 P. 2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988) . This court must "review
an

agency's

interpretation

and

application

of

statutes

for

correctness, unless the statute in question grants the agency
discretion." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991).

This Court must closely

scrutinize

determine

the

Commission's

order

to

whether

the

appropriate legal principles were applied when the Commission
failed to award applicant death benefits.

POINT I
DID THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEED
ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT DENIED APPLICANT
AND HER THREE MINOR CHILDREN DEATH
BENEFITS
WHEN
THE
COMMISSION
DISREGARDED THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF UTAH
CODE
ANN.
§35-1-43(3) (b) ,
WHICH
REQUIRES THE EMPLOYER TO GIVE WRITTEN
NOTICE
TO
BOTH
THE
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION AND THE INSURANCE CARRIER
AND THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER DID NOT DO
THIS?

6

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3) (b) \ states:
A corporation may elect not to include
any director or officer of the corporation as
an employee under this chapter.
If a
corporation makes this election, it shall
serve written notice upon its insurance
carrier and upon the commission naming the
persons to be excluded from coverage.
A
director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee under this chapter
until this notice has been given. (Emphasis
added).
Id.

If the corporation does not "serve written notice upon its

insurance carrier and upon the commission", then the director or
officer is considered an employee.

In the case at hand, the

employer gave the Fund notice, but it is undisputed that the
employer did not give written notice to the Industrial Commission
as required by the statute.

The ALJ found that the employer had

not sent written notice to the Industrial Commission and ordered
the employer's insurance carrier to pay the death benefits to the
widow and three minor children.
The Fund filed a motion for review and the Industrial
Commission granted the motion in a split 2-1 vote. The majority of
the Commission found that when the Fund supplied the Industrial
Commission with a magnetic computer tape, which contains changes in
policy information including updated exclusions of coverage for all
of the Funds' policies, the statute had been satisfied.

The

Commission's decision is reversable for two reasons: first, the
employer did not serve the Commission notice; and, second, the

Since the death of Mr. Olsen, the legislature has changed Utah Code Ann. §351-43(3) (b) to now only require that written notice be given to the insurance
company.

7

magnetic computer tape that contains all of the information of all
of the Fund's numerous policies is not notice and it certainly is
not written notice as required. Because the Industrial Commission
erroneously interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b) this Court
must "review statutory interpretations by agencies for correctness,
giving no deference to the agency's interpretation, unless the
statute grants to the agency the discretion to interpret the
statute." Ferro v. Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah
App. 1992) (citing Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d
581, 588 (Utah 1991)) . Furthermore, the statute does not grant the
Industrial Commission discretion to interpret the statute.
As shown above, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3) (b) states an
employer may elect to exclude officers or directors; however, if
this election is made, the employer shall serve written notice to
both the insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission. The law
is well settled that the effect of the use of the term "may"
signifies permission and generally means that the action spoken of
is optional

or discretionary

and not mandatory

or required.

McMaster v. Mcllroy Bank, 654 S.W. 2d 591, 594 (Ark.App. 1983);
State Exrail Cartwright v. Okl. Natural Gas, 640 P.2d 1341, 1345
(Okl. 1982); State v. Wilson, 264 S.E.2d 414 (So.Car. 1980).
The ordinary and usual meaning of

"may" is one of

permission, discretion or option and not of requirement. The word
"may" when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term
rather than demandatory connotation of the word "shall".
v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728, 729
8

In Herr

(Utah 1974), the Utah

Supreme Court cited Anderson v. Yunakau, 329 U.S. 482 (1946), which
states:
The word "shall" is ordinarily "language of
command." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493,
55 S.Ct. 818, 819, 79 L.Ed. 1566. And when
the same Rule uses both "may" and "shall", the
normal inference is that each is used in its
usual sense--the one act being permissive, the
other mandatory.
Herr, 525 P.2d at 728.
The controlling statute in the case at hand uses both
"may" and "shall." As shown above, it states, "[a] corporation may
elect not to include any director or officer of the corporation as
an employee under this chapter.

If a corporation makes this

election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier
and upon the commission."

That means written notice by the

employer to the Industrial Commission is mandatory. This Court, in
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992),
stated:
Utah courts construing statutes containing
the term "shall" generally have concluded that
term is mandatory. . . . (term "shall" in
statute is usually presumed mandatory rather
than discretionary). (Cites omitted).
Id. at 559. Because the employer did not give written notice then
Mr. Olsen was considered an employee and should have workers'
compensation coverage.

This is consistent with Utah law.

Court stated:
When faced with a question of statutory
construction, we first examine the plain
language of the statute. . . . We will resort
to other methods of statutory interpretation
only if we determine that the language is

This

ambiguous. . . .
Thus, when statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, we will not
look beyond the same to divine legislative
intent....
Additionally, we must assume
"that each term in the statute was used
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read
literally,
unless
such
a
reading
is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." .
(Cites omitted and emphasis added).
Murphy v. Crosland,
Industrial

886 P.2d 74, 79-80 (Utah App. 1994) .

Commission did not determine

that

the

ambiguous, unreasonably confused, or inoperable.
did not raise this defense below either.
very clear and unambiguous.

The

statute is

The defendants

In fact, the statute is

Mr. Olsen is considered an employee

until both the Fund and the Industrial Commission received written
notice from the employer informing them otherwise.
The Commission's decision that the statute does not
require separate notice (R. 107) flies in the face of the plain and
clear language of the statute.

Moreover, the Commission ignores

the affidavit of its own employee, Karla Winkler, which states,
"According to our files & [sic] to the best of my knowledge the
Industrial Commission has not received a corporation exclusion form
on Samuel Mcintyre [sic] Investments."

Ms. Winkler's affidavit

clearly shows that the Commission had not been served written
notice. The Fund did not provide any evidence from the Industrial
Commission that the Commission received the exclusion on the tape.
Commissioner

Carlson

accurately

observed

that

the

Commission "has no authority to disregard the statute's clear
language.

Furthermore,

Compensation Act

the provisions

are to be

liberally
10

of

the Utah Workers'

construed

in favor of

coverage."

Consequently, the Industrial Commission committed

reversible error when it misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. §35-143(3) (b) and denied applicant and her three minor children death
benefits and this Court should reverse the Commission's order and
reinstate the ALJ's order.

POINT II
MUST DEFENDANTS PAY THE DECEDENT'S
WIDOW
AND
THREE
MINOR
CHILDREN
BENEFITS
BECAUSE
THE
DEFENDANT
EMPLOYER DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE
ANN- §35-1-43(3) (b) ?
The Industrial Commission's decision that the Fund's
computer tape satisfies Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b) was really a
pretext to deny benefits because the Commission felt it was unfair
that, "Mr. Olsen, as president and signator for Mclntyre, intended
and

understood

that

his

workers'

compensation

coverage

was

terminated." That may have been Mr. Olsen's intent; however, until
the statute was fully complied with, Mr. Olsen could not change his
status as an employee and could not terminate coverage.
Code Ann. §35-1-45) .

(See, Utah

Consequently, his widow and three children

are entitled to death benefits.
In Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah App.
1990), this Court stated, "The Industrial Commission is not free to
'legislate' in areas apparently overlooked by our lawmakers or to
exercise power not expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
legislature, even in the name of fairness."

11

Id. at 578 (emphasis

added).

By following the clear and unambiguous language of other

statutes, Utah courts have acknowledged
inequitable, results can occur.

harsh, and

sometimes

In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.

of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 883 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court
stated

that

"the Act

allows an at-fault

employer

to escape

liability altogether at the expense of the injured employee.

We

agree with plaintiff that this result is inequitable, but the
effect of the statutory language is clear." Id. at 883

(footnote

omitted) . The same Court reiterated "'where statutory language is
plain and unambiguous, ' we will 'not look beyond the same to divine
legislative intent.'" Id.

(Cite omitted). The Court then stated,

"[w]e are not free 'to assess the wisdom of a statutory scheme.'"
Id.

Moreover, the law in Utah is very clear, "it is for the

judiciary to assume that each term of a statute was advisedly
adopted by the Legislature."
480, 481 (Utah 1980).

Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth. 618 P.2d

In the present case, the Commission may not

like the result; however, the language of the statute is clear,
plain and unambiguous.

Therefore, the decedent was considered an

employee at the time of his death and his family is entitled to
death benefits.
In Hacker v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, 758
P.2d 662, 157 Ariz. 391 (Ariz. App. 1988) the Arizona Court was
faced with a case where the statute required the employee to give
written notice to the employer and the insurance carrier that
coverage was waived. Hacker was the owner of the corporation which
made him both employer and employee.
12

He was killed in the : . _;rse

and scope of his employment.

However, his wife had sent a letter

to the insurance company requesting termination of his benefits.
Yet, after his death, the wife applied for benefits because the
decedent had not written himself a letter notifying himself that he
waived coverage. The insurance company denied benefits and argued
that it would be "ludicrous" for Hacker to write himself a letter.
Id. at 663-5.
However the Arizona court rejected this argument and
awarded benefits.

The reasons were as follows: First, "statutory

formality serves a purpose separate from that of actual notice."
Id. at 665. It also "reinforces the importance of the election of
remedies."

Such a requirement may "help to protect the claimant

'against his own improvidence or folly.'"

Id. (citation omitted).

"Second, the requirement of formal notice is no different than the
corporate directors elect themselves officers or that corporate
officers authorize the payment of salaries to themselves.

It is

simply a consequence of the corporate form of doing business." Id.
The carrier also claimed that such a ruling would create
a "loophole" and a miscarriage of justice.

The Arizona court

stated, "[t]o some extent, this is true. However, both the carrier
and the independent broker involved in this case were in the
insurance business.
requirements

for

a

As a result they should have known the
legally

effective

compensation coverage by an employee."
In

the

present

case,

to

of workers'

Id.
overturn

Commission's order is not unjust either.
13

rejection

the

Industrial

The Fund is the state's

largest workers' compensation insurer and "should have known the
requirements

for

a

legally

effective

compensation coverage by an employee."

rejection
Jd.

of

workers'

In order to protect

itself, the Fund could have continued to charge a premium on the
corporate officers or directors until the employer provided proof
that written notice was given to the Industrial Commission.
Furthermore, the Fund is not without a remedy.

The Fund

admits that it has collected premiums from employers after it
learned that a large group of employees was not covered by the
employer but should have been2.

The Fund even admitted to the

Industrial Commission that as many as 26,500 employers may not have
complied with §35-1-43(3) (b) . 26,500 appears to be a large group
of employees that are not covered but should have been. This gives
the Fund an alternative remedy.

Therefore, this Court should

overturn the Industrial Commission's Order and reinstate the ALJ's
order, which orders defendant to pay applicant death benefits.

CONCLUSION
In this case, the language of Utah Code Ann. §35-143(3) (b) is very clear and unambiguous. Officers and directors are
considered employees until the employer serves written notice upon

2

This is not a new or unusual position. In Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94
(Utah 1981) the employer moved the court to allow it to amend its answer to include
the defense that the injured plaintiff was an employee and the plaintiff's
exclusive remedy was with the Industrial Commission. The employer also told the
Court that coverage could be obtained for plaintiff and eight other individuals
"simply by paying the previously unpaid premiums." Id. at 96.

14

the carrier and the Industrial Commission.
requirement.

This is a mandatory

The Fund stipulated that the Industrial Commission

did not receive notice from the employer. Because the language of
this statute is plain and unambiguous, the Industrial Commission
committed reversible error when it looked beyond the same to divine
legislative intent.

Therefore, this Court should overturn the

Industrial Commission's Order and reinstate the ALJ's order, which
orders defendant to pay applicant death benefits.
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ADDENDUM A

ative" defined — Mining lessees and sublessees
— Partners and sole proprietors — Corporate officers and directors — Real estate agents and
brokers.
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" mean:
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other person, in the
service of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district
under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express
or implied, written or oral, including each officer and employee of the
state institutions of learning and members of the National Guard while
on state active duty; and
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section
35-1-42, who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors,
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but not including any person whose employment' is casual and not in the usual course of the trade,
business, or occupation of his employer.
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter,
any lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter,
and shall be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same
extent as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are paid
employees for substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct from the
proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for t h a t type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include as an employee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes this
election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon
the commission naming the persons to be covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of a sole proprietorship is considered an employee under
this chapter until this notice has been given. For premium rate making,
the insurance carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the employee to
be 150% of the state's average weekly wage.
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the
corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes
this election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and
upon the commission naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A
director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this
chapter until this notice has been given.
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in
Section 61-2-2, who performs services in t h a t capacity for a real estate broker
if:
(n) HubHtnntially all of tho real CHLUIC a u n t ' s or associated broker's
income for services is from real estate commissions;
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are performed under a written contract specifying t h a t the real estate agent is an
independent contractor; and
(c) the contract states t h a t the real estate agent or associated broker is
not to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes.
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative" do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or
64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or regulation.

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paidEach employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the^dependents of each such employee who is killed by accident « ^
~ * c ^ ^
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred if the accident was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
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RECEIVED

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 95-182

NOV 2 01995

JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of,
GREGORY J. OLSEN, Deceased,
Applicant,

w rk

' ?£222*»fta

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
SAMUEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT
COMPANY/WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,

AND ORDER

Defendants.

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August
3, 1995 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing was
cancelled at the request of the parties.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was represented by Eugene Miller,
Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Janet Moffitt,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for death benefits for the widow
and 3 minor children of Gregory J. Olsen, deceased, who died in an
automobile/train accident, while in the course of his employment,
on June 3, 1994. The carrier denies the claim for death benefits,
because the corporate employer notified the carrier in March of
1993 that it chose to exclude Gregory Olsen from coverage. As a
result, the carrier discontinued collecting a premium for coverage
of Olsen.
Olsen was a coporate officer or director of the
corporate employer and U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b) allows optional
exclusion for corporate officers and directors.
The applicant
argues that the corporate employer gave inadequate notice in order
to accomplish exclusion of Olsen as an employee of the corporate
employer and thus, per U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b), Olsen must be
considered an employee of the corporation on the date of his death,
with his widow and children still entitled to benefits.
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The attorneys notified the ALJ, prior to the hearing date,
that the sole issue for resolution in this case was a legal one and
that there were no factual disputes. Therefore, the attorneys
requested that they be allowed to file a fact stipulation and
written argument, in lieu of a hearing, to present the issue to be
decided. The ALJ agreed to allow for this manner of adjudication.
The fact stipulation and applicant's memorandum were received at
the Commission on August 23, 1995 and the defendants' responsive
meorandum was received at the Commission on September 20, 1995.
The matter was considered ready for decision on September 20, 1995.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The undisputed facts in this matter are as follows, verbatim
from the applicant's memorandum:
1.

Gregory James Olsen (Olsen) was a director
or officer of Samuel Mclntyre Investments on
or about June 3, 1994.
He was also an
employee on that date.

2.

Olsen was acting within the course and scope
of his employment at the time of his death.

3.

In March of 1993, the Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah (the Fund) received written
notice from the employer that Mr. Olsen (a
corporate officer) was to be excluded from
coverage.
The employer paid no further
premiums for Mr. Olsen.

4.

The employer did not give written notice to
the Industrial Commission that Mr. Olsen was
te be excluded from coverage. (Exhibit A,
Affidavit from Karla Winkler).

5*

On March 30, 1994, the Workers Compesation
Fund made a computer entry memorializing the
exclusion.
The Fund sent the weekly
computer tape to the Industrial Commission.
Said tape contains changes in policy
information including updated exclusions of
coverage.
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6.

The
Fund
has
collected
premiums
retroactively when the Fund has discovered
that a large group of employees was not
covered by the employer but should have
been. However, this has been done on rare
occasions and on a large scale basis.

ARGUMENT PRESENTED:
Both parties agree that the applicable statutory provision
is U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b), which reads as follows:
A corporation may elect not to include any director
or officer of the coporation as an employee under
this chapter.
If a corporation makes this
election, it shall serve written notice upon its
insurance carrier and upon the commission naming
the persons to be excluded from coverage.
A
director or officer of a corporation is considered
an employee under this chapter until this notice
has been given.
The applicant argues that the plain language of the last
sentence of this provision indicates that, if written notice is not
provided to both the insurance carrier and the Industrial
Commission, by the corporation, there is no exclusion and the nonexcluded directors and officers are considered employees for
workers compensation purposes. The applicant argues that, in the
instant case, although the carrier was notified in writing of the
intended exclusion, the Commission was not, and therefore Olsen
must be considered an employee as of the date of his death. With
respect to the carrier's failure to collect a premium in this case,
the applicant argues that this is the carrier's error and the
carrier should have continued to collect a premimum on Olsen until
such time as it was clear that the corporation had notified the
Commission of the exclusion. In addition, as a means of remedying
the failure to collect a premium after March of 1993, the applicant
argues that the carrier can simply charge the corporation a f,back
premium" for coverage of Olsen for the period from March 1993 to
the date of Olsen's death.
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Counsel for the applicant cites the Arizona case of Hacker
v. Industrial Commission of Arizona. 758 P.2d 662 (Ariz. App. 1988)
as on point. Counsel argues that in Arizona there is a statute
that requires the employee to give notice to the employer if an
exclusion is desired.
In Hacker, apparently the spouse of the
employee gave notice to the insurance carrier that exclusion was
requested. Per counsel for the applicant, the court found this to
be insufficient notice and found that there was a purpose behind
requiring the exact format of notice that the statute required,
even if it resulted in requiring a corporate officer to basically
write himself a letter giving notice of his desire to be Excluded.

Counsel for the defendants argues that the corporate
decision to drop coverage on corporate officers/directors in this
case most cerrainly involved Olsen's input, considering he was a
corporate officer/director.
Counsel argues that
it is
inappropriate to allow corporate officers/directors to profit from
their own non-compliance with the statute. Counsel argues that
this occurs when corporate officers/directors are allowed to decide
to exclude themselves, thereby saving the cost of a premium, and
then are allowed to recover on a claim for benefits after the
desired exclusion, because the corporation failed to do as the
statute requires (i.e. notify the Commission in writing). Counsel
argues that this is an especially inappropriate result when notice
to the Commission serves no purpose. Counsel indicates that the
legislature has recognized that no purpose is served by requiring
notification and has eliminated the requirement for Commission
notice as of the most recent amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b).
Finally, counsel argues that the Commission did receive actual
notice of the exclusion in this case, because the Commission
received the carrier's computer tape which contained the exclusion
information.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ has reread section U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b) many times
over in order to determine whether or not there is any ambiguity in
the language of the statute. In the final analysis, the ALJ finds
that there is no ambiguity and that the last sentence clearly
requires that the corporation itself must give written notice to
both the carrier and the Industrial Commission before an exclusion
is accomplished. Receipt of notice is not a requirement in the
statute and thus the matter of the computer tape received by the
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Commission would seem to be irrelevant. The ALJ finds that, in the
instant case, it is clear that written notice was not given to the
Commission by the corporation, as the statute requires. As such,
per the literal language of U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b), Olsen was not
excluded as an employee and must still be considered an employee of
the corporation at the time of his death. As a result, the widow
and the children are due death benefits.
Having stated the ultimate ruling in this matter, the ALJ
feels compelled to explain that she finds the unambiguous language
of U.C.A; 35-1-43(3) (b) to require an act on the part of corporate
employers (giving notice to the Commission) that has no apparent
underlying purpose.
In addition, as noted by counsel for the
defendants, the language of this section allows for corporate
officers/directors to simply fail to comply with the apparently
purposeless notice and thereby profit as a result. The ALJ cannot
believe this result was intended by the legislature.
The ALJ
should state that she has no information that would confirm that,
in the instant case, Olsen was involved in any intentional attempt
to profit by non-compliance with the statutorily required notice.
It is a possibility, but certainly nothing in the stipulated facts
of this case suggests a corporate attempt to defraud the carrier.
Nonetheless, the ALJ is bothered by the potential for abuse that
the statutory language allows.
Unfortunately, the ALJ cannot
ivalidate
the
legislation
simply
because
she
finds
it
objectionable. Perhaps the legislature was aware of the potential
for abuse when the statute was amended recently. At least the
current reading of the statute does not allow for corporate abuse.
The ALJ should also note that she has rendered het decision
in this matter simply based on what she considers to be unambiguous
language in the statute and not based on the applicants arguments
with respect to the Hacker case or his arguments regarding
potential remedies available to the carrier. The ALJ finds the
Hacker rationale is not exactly on point and it is unclear whether
the carrier remedy suggested by the applicant is actually available
to the carrier in this particular case. In Arizona, the statute
apparently requires notice by the actual employee to be excluded
(as opposed to by the corporation) to the employer (as opposed to
to the Commission). In Hacker the employee's spouse notified the
carrier of the exclusion request. This is clearly a long way from
the requirement that the employee notify the employer.
In the
instant case, compliance with notification was much closer to what
the statute requires and thus it is less clear that the intended
exclusion should be nullified. In addition, apparently, the court
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in Hacker found that there was some purpose to having the employee
do the notification, because it provided evidence of an actual
election of remedies made by the individual who would be entitled
to the benefits. As noted above, the Utah statutory requirement of
notice to the Commission by the corporation does not have any
apparent underlying purpose. Therefore, it is unclear why noncompliance with the requirement should result in a finding of noexclsuion-accomplished. But once again, the ALJ cannot invalidate
the legislation simply because it does not serve any apparent
logical purpose.
Apparently, because the parties wanted the threshold issue
of coverage resolved first, the ALJ has not been provided with
facts relative to the issue of the appropriate compensation rate.
As such, the ALJ will not make an actual accounting of benefits due
in this order. If the applicant is desirous of having an actual
award made in a Supplemental Order, the applicant's attorney should
petition for such and provide the ALJ with a suggested rate that
the defendants can respond to. Otherwise, the ALJ will presume
that the parties will settle the issue of the actual accounting of
benefits due. In the following order, the ALJ will simply note
that death benefits are found due and owing. This conclusion is
based on resolution of the sole legal issue presented to the ALJ in
favor of the applicant.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Samunel
Mclntyre Investment Company/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay
the applicant, Judean Olsen, widow, and her three minor children,
death benefits, as a result of the death of her husband, Gregory J.
Olsen, in the course of his employment with Samuel Mclntyre
Investment Company on June 3, 1994.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2) Utah Code Annotated.

DATED this /& day of November, 1995,

J^L
Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on November /(? 1995, a copy of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of
Judean S. Olsen, Widow of Gregory J. Olsen, Deceased, was mailed to
the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

Judean Olsen
101 Grason Vista Drive
Queenston, UT 21658
Eugene Miller, Jr.
Attorney at Law
311 South State, Suite 340
SLC, UT 84111-2320
Janet Moffitt
Attorney at Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P O Box 57929
SLC, UT 84157-0929

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

hL

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of
GREGORY J. OLSEN, Deceased,

*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Applicant/
*

v.
SAMUEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT CO.
and THE WORKERS7 COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,
Defendants,

Case No. 95-0182

*
*

Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co. ("Mclntyre" hereafter) and the
Workers' Compensation Fund Of Utah (UWCF") ask The Industrial
Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge f s award
of survivors' benefits to Judean S. Olsen, widow of Gregory J.
Olsen, pursuant to the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did Mclntyre satisfy the requirements of §35-1-43(3) (b). of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act for excluding Mr. Olsen from
coverage.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The facts of this case are not in dispute. For many years,
including all times material to this proceeding, Mclntyre purchased
workers' compensation insurance from WCF.
In a letter dated
January 1, 1992 and signed by Gregory J. Olsen as Mclntyre's
president, Mclntyre instructed WCF as follows: "Please exclude the
undersigned, Gregory J. Olsen, an officer and director - of the
policy holder, from coverage under the policy effective 1 January
1992 and until further notice."
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On receipt of the foregoing letter, WCF mailed to Mclntyre, to
Mr. Olsen's attention, a form entitled "Corporate Officer/Director
Exclusion Form". In substance, the form explained that pursuant to
§35-1-43 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, after the form was
completed, signed and returned to WCF, any corporate officers or
directors listed thereon would no longer be Mclntyre's "employees"
for purposes of receiving workers' compensation benefits.
On
February 3, 1992, Mclntyre returned the form, signed by Mr. Olsen
as president of the company. The form listed Mrw. Olsen as the only
officer/director which Mclntyre intended to exclude from workers'
compensation coverage. Based on the foregoing, WCF excluded Mr.
Olsen from coverage under Mclntyre's workers7 compensation
insurance policy and reduced Mclntyre's premium accordingly.1
From February 1992, when Mclntyre excluded Mr. Olsen from
coverage, until Mr. Olsen's death in 1994, Mclntyre paid no
premiums for workers' compensation insurance coverage on Mr. Olsen.
Although Mclntyre did not provide separate notice to the Industrial
Commission that it had excluded Mr. Olsen from coverage, WCF
notified the Industrial Commission in the usual and customary
manner, by means of magnetic tape which was downloaded into the
Industrial Commission's records.
On June 3, 1994, Mr. Olsen died in an accident arising out of
and in the course of his duties for Mclntyre.
DISCUSSION ANP CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to the
dependant survivors of employees who have died as a result of
accidents arising out of and in the course of employment. See Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-45. Corporate officers and directors are generally

1

The Industrial Commission notes some unexplained
inconsistency between the dates which appear on the documents
submitted by WCF and the dates referred to in WCF's motion for
review. However, these inconsistencies do not appear significant
because under either version, Mr. Olsen, on behalf of Mclntyre,
instructed WCF to exclude Mr. Olsen from workers' compensation
coverage prior to Mr. Olsen's death.
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considered "employees" for purposes of the benefits provided by the
Act. However, §35-1-43 of the Act allows corporations to exclude
officers and directors from coverage.
As of the date of Mr.
Olsen's death, the requirements for "opting out#/ with respect to
corporate officers and directors were set forth in §35-1-43(3) (b)
of the Act as follows:
A corporation may elect not to include any director or
officer of the corporation as an employee under this
chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon
the commission naming the person to be excluded from
coverage.
A director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee under this chapter until this
notice has been given.
Thus, at the time of Mr. Olsen's death, §35-1-43 (3) (b)
required written notice to both the insurance carrier and the
Industrial Commission in order to exclude an officer or director
from coverage. It is clear to the Industrial Commission that Mr.
Olsen, as the president and signator for Mclntyre, intended and
understood that his workers' compensation coverage was terminated.
While §35-1-43(3)(b) requires written notice of exclusion to
both the insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission, it does
not require separate notice. In this case, it is undisputed that
Mclntyre, through Mr. Olson as its president, gave written notice
of Mr. Olsen's exclusion to WCF, which in turn notified the
Industrial Commission by means of magnetic tape. As a result, the
Industrial Commission received the same information regarding
Mclntyre's exclusion of Mr. Olsen that it would have received if
Mclntyre had directly notified the Industrial Commission.
In her decis ion, the ALJ concluded that the exclusion
provision of §35-1-43(3) (b) requires two .separate and distinct
written documents to effectuate exclusion. As noted above, the
Industrial Commission finds no requirement of separate notice. The
Industrial Commission also concludes that notice to the Industrial
Commission by means of magnetic tape, when such notice is accurate
and timely, satisfies §35-1-43 (3) (b)'s requirements.
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In summary, the Industrial Commission concludes that pursuant
to §35-1-43(3) (b) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Mclntyre
excluded Mr. Olsen from coverage under the Act. Consequently, Mr.
Olsen's survivors are not entitled to the benefits provided by the
Act.
Because of the foregoing determination, it is unnecessary for
the Industrial Commission to consider the other points raised by
WCF's motion for review.
QRPEE
The Industrial Commission reverses the decision of the ALJ and
grants WCF's motion for review.
The Industrial Commission
concludes that Mr. Olsen was not covered by the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act at the time of his death.
Consequently, his
dependants are not entitled to survivors benefits under the Act.
It is so ordered.
Dated this /0_day

of June, 1996.

I dissent. Although I may be sympathetic to the position
chosen by my colleagues, I find the requirements of §35-1-43(3) (b)
are explicit in their requirement that the employer give notice of
its election to exclude officers and directors from coverage by
giving written notice of such election to both the Industrial
Commission and the insurance carrier. Regardless of the argument
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advanced by the majority that the written notice of exclusion need
not be a separate notice, the plain language of the statute simply
states otherwise. The Industrial Commission has no authority to
disregard the statute's clear language.
Furthermore, the
provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act are to be
liberally construed in favor of coverage. Consequently, I would
conclude, as did the ALJ, that Mclntyre did not meet §3 5-143(3) (b)'s requirements for exclusion of Mr. Olsen.
I would
further conclude that WCF's other arguments are- without merit and
that Mr. Olsen's widow and dependants are entitled to workers'
compensation benefits.
~

• U^Urn^
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by
the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0
days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion
For Review in the matter of Judean S. Olsen, Case No. 95-0182, was
mailed first class postage prepaid this /Q& day of .Mery", 1996, to
the following:

JUDEAN S. OLSEN
101 GRASON VISTA DRIVE
QUEENSTONE, MD. 21658
EUGENE MILLER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
40 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE #300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
JANET L. MOFFITT
ATTORNEY AT LAW
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
P 0 BOX 57029
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157
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Adell 'Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
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